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The evolution of populations is influenced by many factors, and the simple classical models have been
developed in a number of important ways. Both population structure and multiplayer interactions have been
shown to significantly affect the evolution of important properties, such as the level of cooperation or of
aggressive behavior. Here we combine these two key factors and develop the evolutionary dynamics of general
group interactions in structured populations represented by regular graphs. The traditional linear and threshold
public goods games are adopted as models to address the dynamics. We show that for linear group interactions,
population structure can favor the evolution of cooperation compared to the well-mixed case, and we see that the
more neighbors there are, the harder it is for cooperators to persist in structured populations. We further show that
threshold group interactions could lead to the emergence of cooperation even in well-mixed populations. Here
population structure sometimes inhibits cooperation for the threshold public goods game, where depending on
the benefit to cost ratio, the outcomes are bistability or a monomorphic population of defectors or cooperators.
Our results suggest, counterintuitively, that structured populations are not always beneficial for the evolution of
cooperation for nonlinear group interactions.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.93.022407
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conun-
drum in evolutionary biology since Darwin [1–7]. Serv-
ing as an indispensable mathematical model, evolutionary
game theory [5,6,8–10] has become an effective method
to quantify cooperation and predict evolutionary outcomes
for different situations. Some further theoretical analyses on
the evolution of cooperation have been achieved since the
introduction of evolutionary dynamics in both infinite and
finite populations [4,6,11–13]. Within the area of dynamics,
two-player games [14–16] are frequently adopted to model
typical pairwise interactions to understand the evolution of
cooperation [17–26]. Considering the ubiquitously group
interactions ranging from the natural world to human society,
researchers recently generalized two-player games to their
multiplayer versions [27–37], such as the N -person prisoner’s
dilemma [30,38], N -person snowdrift game [31,32], N -person
stag hunt game [39], as well as the N -person ultimatum
game [40]. In a typical collective action, an individual’s payoff
could be no longer the simple summation of many pairwise
interactions [33,41], and instead it is replaced by the multiple
interactive payoffs from multiplayer games, which depends on
what strategies all other opponents hold in the same group.
The various compositions of different strategies in group
interactions give the possibility for the emergence of nonlinear
fitness [29].
Evolutionary dynamics for strategies in group interactions
are complex even in the ideally structureless (well-mixed)
populations, with outcomes which cannot be obtained from
pairwise interactions [28–30,33,34,37,42,43]. In reality, the
introduction of not merely multiplayer games but also
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structured populations gives rise to polynomial as well
as nonlinear fitness functions in evolutionary dynam-
ics [28,29,33,34,38,44–47]. Hence it has added a lot of
difficulty to conduct analytical explorations for this case.
Even so, some significant work has emerged. For the cyclic
population, van Veelen et al. [44] give analytical conditions
for cooperation to evolve with general multiplayer games
for any intensity of selection. Based on the unequal sharing
of diffusible common goods in microbial colonies, with
a particular population structure indicating the diffusible
process, Allen et al. [45] give the analytic relation between
benefits and costs guarantying the success of cooperation.
Considering the typical discounted, linear, and synergistic
group interactions, Li et al. [46,48] provide the theoretical
rules for the emergence and stabilization of cooperation in
structured populations represented by regular graphs.
Spatial reciprocity is generally accepted as one of the five
rules facilitating the evolution of cooperation [7], and some
theoretical results as well as experiments have validated this
rule by illustrating the positive function of spatial interactions
represented by lattice or complex networks [17,33,46,49–52].
However, we should not ignore some special cases where
the detrimental effect of spatial structure on cooperation is
revealed under the framework of the snowdrift game [18].
The presence of both multiplayer games and population
structure enriches the outcomes of evolutionary dynamics.
Moreover, as we consider general group interactions in
structured populations, we are provided with a much greater
chance to explore the effects of population structure on
the evolution of cooperation. However, due to its inher-
ent complexity, until now the evolutionary dynamics has
only been given for some specific games or well-mixed
populations [12,31,32,39,44,45,48,53,54]. Here we give the
evolutionary dynamics for an arbitrary multiplayer game with
two strategies in structured populations represented by regular
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FIG. 1. Group interactions in structured populations. We choose 14 individuals from a population with degree k = 3 to explain group
interactions in structured populations. The nodes shown as squares and circles represent individuals with strategy X and Y , respectively. The
individual with a blue square has three neighbors (colored orange). During evolution, in each generation, every player will organize a game
with a group of size k + 1 comprising itself and its neighbors. Taking the blue square as an example, we find that its payoff consists of four
games: one organized by itself [circled by the dashed line in (a)] and another three organized by its three neighbors independently [circled by
the dashed line in (b), (c), and (d)]. Using the payoff matrix, we give the corresponding payoff of the blue square in each panel, where the
subscript indicates the number of individuals involved in the game with strategy X. Payoffs of other individuals can be calculated in the same
way in each generation, and after that, a death-birth process is employed to characterize the evolution of strategies in the population.
graphs. Whatever the specific form of the payoff functions,
the general multiplayer game just requires the discrete payoff
values on every possible composition of strategies. Moreover,
two typical multiplayer games are employed as examples to
explore the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.
We find that some counterintuitive results are obtained from
these examples.
II. MODEL
We consider an infinitely structured population depicted
by a regular graph with degree k. The vertices of the graph
represent individuals. The edges determine who interacts with
whom for the game payoff and who competes with whom
for reproduction. In contrast to the well-mixed population,
population structure allows players to interact locally; i.e.,
in each generation, every individual participates in k games
organized by its neighbors and one game organized by
itself [46,50] (see Fig. 1). Both types of game consist of k + 1
players. For every player in the population, after playing k + 1
games, they will attain payoffs accumulated from every single
game in which they are involved. The payoff matrix for a
general multiplayer game with size n = k + 1 is presented as
Opposing X players 0 1 · · · i · · · k − 1 k
X a0 a1 · · · ai · · · ak−1 ak
Y b0 b1 · · · bi · · · bk−1 bk
where ai and bi depict the payoffs obtained by the players
with strategy X and Y , respectively. The subscript i is the
number of players adopting strategy X in the game (see Fig. 1).
Based on the payoffs of each individual, the “death-birth” (DB)
process is employed to capture the update process, where an
individual in the population is randomly chosen to die at each
evolutionary step, and then all of its neighbors compete for
the vacant site, gaining it with probability proportional to their
fitness.
In structured populations, pair approximation is adopted
to capture the evolution of strategies, where, in princi-
ple, the population structures are represented by regular
graphs [19,46,55,56]. The notations pXY and pX are used to
indicate the frequency of XY pairs and strategy X. For an
individual with strategy Y , the probability for him or her to
find someone with strategyX is qX|Y . Hence based on the above
definitions, we have the relations between these notations as
pX + pY = 1, qX|X + qY |X = 1,
pXY = pY qX|Y , pXY = pYX,
where in this physical system, all variables could be repre-
sented by pX and qX|X.
After long calculations with the evolutionary process of the
whole population captured by pX and qX|X, we find that the
global frequency change of pX is very slow due to the weak
selection intensity w [19,46,56]. Furthermore, we have
qX|X = k − 2
k − 1pX +
1
k − 1 (1)
at evolutionary equilibrium based on the separation of two
time scales [57]. According to the above relation between pX
and qX|X, all variables in the dynamic evolutionary system
can be expressed only by pX mathematically when it is
stable (for the detailed deviations, see [46]). It elucidates
that as the composition of the structured population in term
of individual strategies is stable, we could obtain the more
detailed information about the population by considering only
the fraction of the players with strategy X.
Hence, as we use x to indicate the expected change
of the frequency of cooperators, we have the deterministic
evolutionary dynamics
x˙ = w(k − 2)
k(k − 1) x(1 − x)f (x), (2)
where f (x) = k(πYX − πYY ) + [(k − 2)x + 1][(πXX − πXY ) −
(πYX − πYY )], and πYX is the mean payoff of the player adopting
strategy X, who is the neighbor of the selected individual
with strategy Y . The above equation gives the evolutionary
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dynamics of group interactions in structured populations,
from which we could obtain the deterministic evolutionary
direction of the population by virtue of the sign of f (x);
that is, the physical change of the strategy composition is
simplified by analyzing f (x). Considering the configuration
of the population structure around the selected individual who
has kX neighbors adopting strategy X, we have
πXX = akX +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i) ∗
[
ai+1 + i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)al+1
+ (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)al
]
,
πXY = bkX+1 +
k−1∑
i=0
q(i) ∗
[
bi+1 + i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)bl+1
+ (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)bl
]
,
πYX = akX−1 +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i) ∗
[
ai + i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)al+1
+ (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)al
]
,
πYY = bkX +
k−1∑
i=0
q(i) ∗
[
bi + i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)bl+1
+ (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)bl
]
.
p(i) and q(i) are the function of i,
p(i) = (k − 1)!
i!(k − 1 − i)!q
i
X|Xq
k−1−i
Y |X ,
q(i) = (k − 1)!
i!(k − 1 − i)!q
i
X|Y q
k−1−i
Y |Y ,
which denote the probability for players (who are neighbors
of the selected individual) adopting strategy X and Y to
find i players with strategy X and k − 1 − i with Y in the
player’s other k − 1 neighbors except the selected individual,
respectively, where qX|X = (k − 2)x/(k − 1) + 1/(k − 1),
qX|Y = (k − 2)x/(k − 1),qY |X = (k − 2)(1 − x)/(k − 1), and
qY |Y = 1 − (k − 2)x/(k − 1).
III. LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAME
For the traditional public goods game [30], every cooperator
contributes a benefit b to the group at a cost c (b > c), while
defectors pay nothing, and eventually the totally collected
benefits from all cooperators are distributed evenly to every
group member irrespective of their previous strategies. As to
the payoff matrix, mapping X and Y to the strategy cooperation
and defection severally, we have
ai = (i + 1)b
n
− c, bi = ib
n
,
with 0  i  n − 1, and the corresponding evolutionary dy-
namics for well-mixed populations is
x˙ = x(1 − x)[b/n − c], (3)
where n is the group size. According to Eq. (2), we obtain the
evolutionary dynamics (see Appendix A)
x˙ = w(n − 3)
n − 2 x(1 − x)
[
n + 2
n
b − nc
]
(4)
in structured populations where every individual has k neigh-
bors (n = k + 1 here). Considering n > n2/(n + 2), the evo-
lutionary dynamics indicates that the structured populations
could better pave the way for cooperation than the structureless
cases [see Figs. 2(a), 2(b), 2(d), and 2(e)]. It has also been
pointed out that the benefit and cost of the cooperative behavior
only experience a linear payoff transformation as we move
from the structureless population to the structured [48]. Now
let us consider the net benefit ¯b and cost c¯ for a cooperator. We
have the relations
c¯ = c − b
n
, ¯b = n − 1
n
b
between b and ¯b, c and c¯. Hence we get that cooperation could
flourish in a structured population if
¯b
c¯
>
n(n − 1)
2
. (5)
This means that the system will always end up in full
cooperation if the above condition is satisfied. As we have
shown that, for the structured population represented by the
regular graph with degree k, every player has k neighbors
and is engaged in group interactions with size n = k + 1. Our
results for group interactions captured by the public goods
game in structured populations suggest that cooperators will
gain a foothold if the net benefit and net cost ratio ¯b/c¯ exceeds
half of the product of the number of neighbors and the size of
the group interactions.
IV. THRESHOLD PUBLIC GOODS GAME
For the threshold public goods game (also called the n-
person stag-hunt dilemma [39]), public goods is available as
the number of cooperators in the group meets a predetermined
threshold, and, if not, meaning that the collective target is
not achieved, every player gets nothing while cooperators still
suffer the cost they have paid. In this case, we have
ai = i + 1
n
bθ (i − M + 1) − c,
(6)
bi = i
n
bθ (i − M),
where M is the threshold for the collective target, and
the Heaviside step function θ (x) satisfies θ (x < 0) = 0 and
θ (x  0) = 1. As M = 0 or 1, the threshold public goods
game degenerates to its linear version. Here, for simplicity, we
consider the largest threshold, M = n.
For the replicator dynamics in well-mixed populations [6],
we have
x˙ = x(1 − x)(bxn−1 − c),
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FIG. 2. Evolutionary dynamics for linear and threshold public goods games in well-mixed and structured populations. Each arrow below
the panels gives the range of benefit-to-cost ratio b/c, up to which the corresponding evolutionary dynamics are shown. The direction of
selection dynamics is indicated by the arrow in each panel, where the small solid circle represents a stable equilibrium and an empty circle
represents an unstable equilibrium. In structured populations, the group size is n = k + 1. In (c), the internal unstable equilibrium is x∗w , and
for (g) it is x∗s . In (h) the inset is employed to show that F (x) > 0 as x → 0, and it shares the same labels as the main panel. Parameters are
w = 0.01,c = 1,k = 5,n = 6, and the others for (a) and (d) are b = 4, (b), (c), (e), and (g) b = 10, (f) b = 1.1, (h) b = 2000.
where n is the group size. In this case, we find bistability of the
evolutionary outcomes, suggesting that the simple nonlinear
group interactions (with maximum threshold) give the possi-
bility for cooperators to take over the whole population [see
Fig. 2(c)] whatever the value of b/c; i.e., if the initial frequency
of cooperators is bigger than x∗w = n−1
√
c/b, cooperators will
occupy the whole population. However, for the linear public
goods game, it is impossible for cooperators to take over the
population as b/c < n.
When we consider the population structure, according to
the Eq. (2), the evolutionary dynamics (see Appendix B) is
x˙ = w (n − 3)(n − 1)(n − 2) x (1 − x)
×
{
bn
[(n − 3)x + 1]n−1
(n − 2)n−2 − n(n − 1)c
}
. (7)
Hence we have that cooperators could take over the population
(see Appendix B) if and only if
b
c
>
n − 1
n − 2 . (8)
For defectors, the criterion is
b
c
> (n − 1)(n − 2)n−2. (9)
The evolutionary outcomes are divided into three cases
based on the value of b/c [see Figs. 2(f) to 2(h)], where
pure defectors, bistability of defectors and cooperators, and
pure cooperators are presented. It shows that a structured
population could favor the evolution of cooperation more
than a well-mixed population when b/c > (n − 1)(n − 2)n−2
[see Fig. 2(h)], given that in the former case the population
will merely consist of cooperators. When b/c decreases but
is bigger than (n − 1)/(n − 2), the advantage of cooperators
declines, where, similarly to the well-mixed cases, an in-
ternal unstable equilibrium x∗s = [ n−1
√
(n − 1)(n − 2)n−2c/b −
1]/(n − 3) emerges [see Fig. 2(g)]. However, we should not
miss the situation with b/c < (n − 1)/(n − 2) where cooper-
ators become extinct [see Fig. 2(f)], which will never happen
for well-mixed populations accompanied by the cooperative
attraction interval ( n−1√(n − 2)/(n − 1),1] [see Fig. 2(c)],
telling us that population structure is not always beneficial
for cooperators.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Population structure invokes much more complexity in
exploring the evolution of cooperation under the metaphor of
multiplayer games; thus Monte Carlo numerical simulations
are frequently employed to investigate this issue. Here we
theoretically address the evolutionary dynamics of general
group interactions in structured populations represented by
regular graphs, where the payoff functions are not necessarily
continuous. Two popular examples, linear and threshold public
goods games, are adopted to illustrate the dynamics. We
find that the threshold public goods game could give the
possibility of the emergence of cooperation with the maximum
threshold even when the benefit to cost ratio b/c is small in
well-mixed populations, which is impossible for the linear
case. Counterintuitively, we find that population structure is not
always helpful for the evolution of cooperation under simple
nonlinear group interactions (for example, the public goods
game with maximum threshold). Our results give another
case demonstrating that spatial reciprocity sometimes cannot
facilitate the evolution of cooperation under nonlinear group
interactions, in addition to the sole preceding one under the
metaphor of the snowdrift game [18].
As we explore the effects of population structure on the
evolution of cooperation for group interactions, the concept
of total payoffs [46,50] is adopted to capture the interac-
tions, where each individual acquires payoffs from the game
organized by itself as well as its neighbors. However for
well-mixed populations, the average payoff for each individual
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is usually considered; i.e., it is the average payoff from one
group interaction for individuals with different strategies. We
have retained these conventions, since they do not affect our
substantive results; if we had used the total payoff for our
well-mixed populations, for example, the rate of change in the
replicator dynamics would be increased, but the phase space
and equilibria would be completely unchanged.
At first sight it is puzzling that, following Eq. (1), structured
populations are more favorable for cooperation (strategy X)
than the well-mixed population, given that the conditional
probability clearly means that neighbors are more likely than
random to be of their own type. For the threshold public goods
game, a tightly clustered group of defectors would score zero,
but this would be better than their cooperator neighbors, as any
such neighbor would likely have contributions from games
involving at least one defector, giving a negative reward. In
the well-mixed case, this would not be true and cooperators
would be more likely to receive benefits. In particular for the
structured game, one of the contributions to an individual’s
reward is the game centered on an individual that it might
replace. Thus if we consider the possibility of a cooperator
replacing a defector, the defector will have a contribution
from the cooperator-centered game, and the cooperator will
have a contribution from the defector-centred game. In the
well-mixed game this is not the case as it involves a (or
several) random group(s) including the given individual. From
the perspective of theory, we could consider an example like
this: assuming there are k + 1 cooperators (strategy X) in
a structured population with the configuration of a cooper-
ator surrounded by k cooperator neighbors, then we have
qX|X = 2/(k + 1) and pX = (k − 3)/[(k + 1)(k − 2)] for the
structured population according to Eq. (1). For the well-mixed
case, qX|X = pX, and qX|X could be smaller than that for its
structured counterpart; however, it is possible for well-mixed
populations to have more cooperators than structured ones
when (k − 3)/[(k + 1)(k − 2)] < pX < 2/(k + 1). Thus it is
possible for well-mixed populations sometimes to be better
for cooperation (X) than structured populations. We note that
the same relationship as Eq. (1) also occurs for pairwise
interactions [19] as well as group interactions with synergy and
discounting [46], and it shows that, in probability, population
structure could favor the evolution of cooperation [17].
Furthermore, the coevolution of population structure and
strategy is explored analytically using linking dynamics,
where the evolutionary dynamics derived from well-mixed
populations [12] could give good approximations for that [22].
For general group interactions, it is worth exploring the
validation of general evolutionary dynamics on situations
where the population structure (not well-mixed) is allowed
to switch during evolution (also known as coevolutionary
dynamics [58]). Here our result may provide a theoretical
approximation for more complicated evolutionary scenarios
with the evolution of enormous configurations of population
structures.
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APPENDIX A: THE DERIVATION PROCESS OF EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS FOR THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME
For the public goods game, using X and Y to represent cooperation represented by C) and defection (represented by D), we
have
k−1∑
i=0
p(i)ai =
k−1∑
i=0
(k − 1)!
i!(k − 1 − i)!q
i
C|Cq
k−1−i
D|C
[ (i + 1)b
k + 1 − c
]
= −c + b
k + 1
[
1 +
k−1∑
i=1
(k − 1)!
(i − 1)!(k − 1 − i)!q
i
C|Cq
k−1−i
D|C
]
= −c + b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)qC|C],
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)al+1 =
k−1∑
l=0
(k − 1)!
l!(k − 1 − l)!q
l
C|Cq
k−1−l
D|C
[ (l + 2)b
k + 1 − c
]
= −c + b
k + 1[2 + (k − 1)qC|C],
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)al =
k−1∑
l=0
(k − 1)!
l!(k − 1 − l)!q
l
C|Dq
k−1−l
D|D
[ (l + 1)b
k + 1 − c
]
= −c + b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)qC|D],
k−1∑
i=0
q(i)bi =
k−1∑
i=0
(k − 1)!
i!(k − 1 − i)!q
i
C|Dq
k−1−i
D|D
ib
k + 1 =
b
k + 1(k − 1)qC|D =
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)bl,
and
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)bl+1 =
k−1∑
l=0
(k − 1)!
l!(k − 1 − l)!q
l
C|Dq
k−1−l
D|D
(l + 1)b
k + 1 =
b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)qC|C].
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Hence we obtain
πDC − πDD = akC−1 − bkC +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i)ai −
k−1∑
i=0
q(i)bi +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i) ∗
[
i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)al+1 + (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)al
]
−
k−1∑
i=0
q(i) ∗
[
i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l)bl+1 + (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l)bl
]
= −c − c + b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)qC|C] −
b
k + 1(k − 1)qC|D +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i) ∗
(
i ∗
{
− c + b
k + 1[2 + (k − 1)qC|C]
}
+ (k − 1 − i)
{
− c + b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)qC|D]
)}
−
k−1∑
i=0
q(i) ∗
{
i ∗ b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)qC|C] + (k − 1 − i)
b
k + 1(k − 1)qC|D
}
= −2c + b
k + 1[1 + (k − 1)(qC|C − qC|D)] +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i) ∗
{
− (k − 1)c + b
k + 1[2i + k − 1 + (k
2 − 3k + 2)pC]
}
−
k−1∑
i=0
q(i) b
k + 1[2i + (k
2 − 3k + 2)pC]
= −2c + 2b
k + 1 − (k − 1)c +
b
k + 1(k − 1) +
2b
k + 1
k−1∑
i=0
i[p(i) − q(i)]
= −(k + 1)c + b + 2b
k + 1 =
(k + 3)b
k + 1 − (k + 1)c (A1)
and
πCC − πCD −
(
πDC − πDD
) = akC − bkC+1 − (akC−1 − bkC )+
k−1∑
i=0
p(i)(ai+1 − ai) +
k−1∑
i=0
q(i)(bi − bi+1)
= b
k + 1
k−1∑
i=0
[p(i) − q(i)] = 0. (A2)
Therefore, substituting Eqs. (A1) and (A2) into Eq. (2), we get the evolutionary dynamics (4) for the public goods game.
APPENDIX B: THE DERIVATION PROCESS OF EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS FOR THE
THRESHOLD PUBLIC GOODS GAME
For the threshold public goods game shown in Eq. (6) with M = k + 1, we have
(
πCC − πCD
)− (πDC − πDD ) = p(k − 1)(ak − ak−1) = b
(
k − 2
k − 1x +
1
k − 1
)k−1
and
πDC − πDD = −c −
k−1∑
i=0
p(i) c +
k−1∑
i=0
p(i)
[
i
k−1∑
l=0
p(l) (−c) + i p (k − 1) b + (k − 1 − i)
k−1∑
l=0
q(l) (−c)
]
= b (k − 1)
(
k − 2
k − 1x +
1
k − 1
)k
− (k + 1)c.
Hence we obtain the evolutionary dynamics (7) for the threshold public goods game with n = k + 1.
Denoting x˙ = F (x), we have F (0) = F (1) = 0, and
F ′(x) = w (k − 2)
k (k − 1) [(1 − x) f (x) − x f (x) + x (1 − x) f
′(x)].
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If F ′(1) < 0, it means that x = 1 is stable, and we have
F ′(1) < 0 ⇐⇒ f (1) > 0 ⇐⇒ b
c
>
k
k − 1 .
If F ′(0) > 0, it means that x = 0 is unstable, and we have
F ′(0) > 0 ⇐⇒ f (0) > 0 ⇐⇒ b
c
> k (k − 1)k−1.
Thus the criteria (8) and (9) are obtained for n = k + 1.
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